INTRODUCTION
This commentary first briefly situates the package within a continuum of procedural changes and then outlines the long-standing discussion regarding Employment Tribunal reform. The next segment delves into the reforms by considering three provisions which are: the requirement for claimants to report their claims to Acas first; fees for launching claims; and settlement offers. This discussion is interspersed with references to Government documents anticipating the changes. Based on these foregoing sections, the final portion of this commentary investigates instructive themes emerging from the current reforms package. The
Coalition's plans are of particular importance to small to medium-sized (SME) and micro businesses. The emphasis of Employment Regulation is being shifted to that of an easy-to-use format accessible to those entirely unfamiliar with these regulations. Together this package suggests fundamental change in employment law: a retrenchment of the parameters for access to redress which has the potential to limit the enforcement of recognised employment rights, especially when determined by their impact on business.
SITUATING THE PROCEDURAL REFORMS
A
. An Issue in Perennial Development
The benchmark for Employment Tribunals has been the statement from the Donovan Royal
Commission: a procedure which is 'easily accessible, informal, speedy and inexpensive'.
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The phrase has become a mantra but not dogma since informality has arguably given way to formality. As a result of fees being introduced as a precondition for claims, accessibility has now come into question. Speed within an efficiency context is the focal point. With the ERRA and the 2013 Regulations, costs have been confirmed as a paramount concern.
The costs associated with raising claims have been an underlying issue for some time. In 1994, the Green Paper Resolving Employment Rights Disputes -Options for Reform Cmnd.
2707/94 suggested tribunals be given the power to dismiss claims at a pre-hearing review. employers had a 73% chance of success at tribunal. 17 For the Government this fact is irrelevant because the cost (or at least the perception) arises when a claim is launched. Cost certainty for employers is the aim: 'The risk is that the fear of being faced with tribunal claims impedes growth because businesses become too cautious to hire people or to address capability issues in the workforce'. 18 The current plan takes a different approach from
Gibbons who suggested early resolution of disputes (notably at an informal stage). The Government's perspective on early resolution focuses on the benefits for one side: if claims arise, they should be disposed of before employers are to expend any financial resources.
The perceived ease in launching a claim and the associated costs founds employers' concern over costs. market competitiveness; 34% of claims are withdrawn by applicants; employers are four times more likely to win but 26% are still settling even when told they can win. 20 These statistics reinforce employers' and therefore the Government's concern over wasted expenditure when it comes to employment claims.
THE REFORMS
The procedural reforms of the ERRA and the 2013 Regulations present subtle yet nonetheless significant change. The aim of this paper is not to provide a comprehensive listing of the reforms but to highlight three of particular note: the requirement for claimants to report their claims to Acas first; fees for launching claims; and settlement offers.
A. Mandatory Consultation with Acas
Prior to submitting their claims to the tribunal, workers ('prospective claimants') must report their claims details to Acas (s.7 of the ERRA adding s.18A to the Employment Tribunals Act 1996). During the prescribed period (which remains to be defined), a conciliation officer shall 'endeavour to promote a settlement between the persons who would be parties to the proceedings'. If settlement is not possible or the period expires, the prospective claimant must obtain a certificate confirming such. Still, Acas conciliation is not mandatory (either party can refuse). 21 Arguably, the voluntariness of conciliation continues a lack of commitment to dispute resolution between the parties. Mandatory consultation finds its basis in the idea of costs. Since fewer than one third of claimants sought out Acas, the Government speculates this body can reduce the number of claims which reach the tribunal by 12,000. 23 The WERS 2011 suggests that many may continue to opt out of this process as the authors found few used dispute resolution.
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Mandating Acas be involved addresses the concerns of SMEs insofar as employers have not had to put out any money at this point and the claims may potentially be averted.
Other factors may affect the success of this plan. The problem with such heavy reliance on Acas is that there is currently a funding issue for the body. 25 When the 2004 Regulations came into effect, the Government budgeted £850,000 for implementation costs. 26 There do not appear to be any such budgeted costs at present. One target for further funds would be adding to the number of caseworkers at Acas could better facilitate settling cases at an early stage. 27 Unfortunately, the reporting requirement may form a gateway to further issues regarding the information provided to Acas and whether information is absent or the proper materials were provided. Aside from funding, claimants' attitudes are clearly targeted by this measure. It appears that Acas' filtering role will entail putting the realities of claims success to the individuals (claims forms now have the median awards listed for this purpose). The ethos behind the introduction of fees for launching claims is: those who use government services should pay for them. 28 Fees can help to offset some of the planned 23% budget reduction over four years which began in 2011. 29 The Government expects to recover approximately 33% of the cost of employment tribunal proceedings through these fees. 30 The introduction of fees suggests a departure from Gibbons' recommendation that the system should be made cheaper. rights are spread across a number of sources and claims today often combine different rights.
B. Introduction of Fees for Launching Claims

The Employment Tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal Fees
In itself, the procedure for launching a claim can dissuade. Many workers have found completing the preceding version of ET1 forms for claims to be a 'daunting experience'. potential for the entirety of costs considerations to create a 'chilling effect' dissuading those who may have claims to make. A judicial review of the fees was heard in Scotland where the
Court of Session refused an interim interdict on the grounds of an undertaking by the
Government that if the fees were found to be unlawful they would be refunded with interest and that the case required a full hearing. In England, the court granted a judicial review application regarding the lawfulness of the fees submitted by Unison, but refused to grant an interim injunction to stop the fees from coming into force as scheduled.
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C. Settlement Offers/Pre-Termination Negotiations
Amendments to settlement offers incentivise the early resolution of disputes. Again, much depends on the 'critical role' 37 ACAS continues to play. The Government will rely on Acas to set out 'in accompanying guidance how the appropriate use of settlement agreements sits within broader good management practices, and the type of good practice we expect businesses will normally follow'. 38 There will be no guideline tariff for settlement agreements because of opposition to it, 39 but factors include:
• Terms of contract such as remuneration, notice period, and untaken annual leave; • How difficult it would be to fill the post and the value of the individual to the organisation;
• The individual's perception of how long it would take them to find another job; and • The perceived liability to the employer of any potential employment tribunal claim.
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In response to consultation on settlement agreements, Acas will provide detailed assistance to parties such as guidance on 'what parties need to do to make a settlement agreement legally valid' (including a ten calendar day period during which workers must consider such an agreement) and template letters. 41 Not noted in the aforementioned Acas and government documents, Busby and McDermont's research identified the need for clear parameters to
Acas' role which can be readily understood by service-users. This step would seem necessary given the significant reliance on Acas for the success of these reforms.
The trigger for admissibility of settlement negotiations raises questions. Improper behaviour is the benchmark. 42 Concerns about improper behaviour suggest that the premise is more about dispensing with claims. 43 The focus on boosting the economy places the emphasis with regards to settlement offers on the disposal of claims so as to protect the financial resources of employers; thereby playing into the notion of vexatious litigants who waste employers' financial resources. Recently, Acas has provided sparse commentary on what constitutes 'improper behaviour' within the context of settlement agreements. 44 It will be with interest that the Acas guidance and the implementation of settlement offers will be monitored.
Overall, instruction should be taken from the impetus for the proposed procedural reforms:
concerns over vexatious litigants and frivolous claims. Aim has been taken at perceived motivations of workers for pursuing claims. 
THEMES
The unifying idea of this section is that the reforms are premised on cost certainty for employers; that is, eliminating 'vexatious' actions and streamlining the claims process so that the overall numbers are reduced thereby presenting a cost saving on employment regulation.
A. (Vexatious) Claims as a Hindrance to Economic Growth
These reforms are most significant because they retrench the practice of employment law.
First, there is a subtle indictment of lawyers and rights litigation. Since financial resources are not as plentiful amongst workers, contingency fee arrangements have become more common.
Despite Lord Justice Jackson's endorsement, 46 criticism persists against no-win-no-fee arrangements which (to many) take the risk off of the worker. are economically viable'. 48 If the aim is to curb the number of claims, then the issue includes regulation of how the law processes these claims and this necessarily involves lawyers. In effect, employment law is being retrenched. These reforms taint rights litigation in a manner so as to make launching a claim economically impracticable if not socially contrarian.
Somehow those who make employment claims are automatically viewed as potential abusers of the system (vexatious litigants) and, now, these individuals are being said to threaten the country's economy. Moreover, these amendments suggest little confidence in tribunals and courts and despite low claimant success rates (if one measures Tribunal efficiency in this manner). The growing force of the adverse attitude towards employment regulation is perhaps the most dangerous challenge to access to rights redress.
Second, employment law is being reformed based on a concept of flexibility. Throughout this package of changes, flexibility has been about meeting business needs through the fluctuations of the economy so that employers may 'hire people to meet new challenges, knowing they can reduce the size of their workforce if economic circumstances require'.
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Economic pressures do not obscure the significant challenges to access to employment law redress posed by these reforms. The effect of these amendments may not be readily noticeable for some time, but the practice of this discipline (especially on the claimant side) must confront these reforms. The shift is unmistakable: a movement away from dispute resolution to conflict management where the latter (as a result of reforms like fees) is a construct leveraged in favour of employers. Though some may point to previous reforms and how employment law trudged on, the consideration here is the accumulation of change: is there a point at which employment law can no longer remain a viable avenue for workplace redress?
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B. Focus on Small Business
According to 2010 statistics from BIS, small to medium-sized firms accounted for a combined 48% of private sector employment. 51 Seemingly with this substantial figure in mind, the Government has shifted the emphasis of regulation towards ease of use for those who are less likely to employ legal or human resource assistance.
The case for regulation in favour of SMEs has been developing for some time. time. 57 The scenario begs the question: if we want government to abstain from significant employment regulation, should it be relied upon to shore up gaps created by businesses?
Moreover, SMEs' expectations appear to contradict the essence of the 'Big Society'.
C. SMEs' Lack of Awareness of Employment Regulation
The difficulty with the Government's benchmark of SMEs is that while much may be done to benefit them, SMEs are most likely to be unaware of this largesse. The report of Jordan et al identified this curiosity: 'There was no evidence that these employers were aware of the increased qualifying period for unfair dismissal'. 58 Little surprise should arise that confidence in being compliant with regulations increased with larger employers who had developed formal policies and was low amongst SMEs. It may be quizzical as to why although 'these employers felt they were at risk of litigation there was little motivation to change their working practices because they believed that working informally maintained better working relationships with staff and ensured managerial autonomy'. 59 The decision to adhere to informality for reasons of staff morale can be valid, but this does not eliminate the risk these employers run in not having procedures to apply when circumstances arise.
Given SMEs' ignorance of regulations being made for their benefit coupled with a seeming reluctance to be better informed, one must wonder at the extensive package being unveiled.
SMEs' anxiety has driven these changes and yet that anxiety will remain. 60 The difficulty here lies not in regulation but in informing a reluctant group. SMEs' inflated sense of risk in the absence of accurate information (and one could add reinforcing such an attitude by legislating based on this quicksand) creates a moving target for reform efforts. 57 Jordan et al, (iv). 58 Ibid., 29. 59 Jordan et al., (ii). 60 Ibid., (i).
A better foundation through which to achieve desired goals may be the promotion of accurate information for both workers and SMEs. Only now have details regarding median awards been provided on ET1 and ET3 forms. 61 These figures are lower and more representative ($4560) than the average awards (£9133) which are buoyed by a few larger sums. 62 Another (though perhaps more controversial) focus is to address the perception of employment advice as an unnecessary expenditure or luxury. An intriguing illustration arises from accounting. The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants notes that accountants are being asked by their clients for employment advice. 63 Clearly SMEs prefer a one-stop source of information. Reliance on accountants by this cohort illustrates that the work done by those in employment law is undervalued.
CONCLUSION
There was a time when ETs were encompassed by the acronym ADR. These reforms clearly demonstrate this to no longer be the case. The aim of these reforms has ostensibly been economic improvement and yet one cannot easily gloss over the second-class treatment of employment regulation and those working within it. There is a movement away from has not increased the rate of resolution'.) 65 but here there is greater codification even if it is aimed at reducing the burden on employers. Curiously contradiction seems inevitable: the reforms formalise much and yet, this is in opposition to the wishes of SMEs. The
Government has skipped an important step which is clearly present in the information before them. Efforts must be made to inform claimants and SMEs about the process of employment law. Then Government must permit the different layers of dispute resolution to unfold. The current reforms package seems more suited to arrive after the first step has been embraced, employed and found wanting.
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